The interest group process by DUNLEAVY, Patrick
How should the interest group process operate in a liberal 
democracy?
✦	 Elected representatives and politicians should recognise a need for continuous 
consultation and dialogue with different sections of the public over detailed policy 
choices. Procedures for involving interest groups in decisions affecting them should 
cover the full range of stakeholders.
✦	 The resources for organising collective voices and political action in pressure 
groups, trade unions, trade associations, non-governmental organisations, charities, 
community groups and other forms should be readily available. In particular, 
decision-makers should recognise the legitimacy of autonomous collective actions 
and mobilisations by different groups of citizens.
✦	 The costs of organising effectively should be low and within reach of any social 
group or interest. State or philanthropic assistance should be available to ensure 
that a balanced representation of all affected interests can be achieved in the policy 
process.
✦	 Decision-makers should recognise inequalities in resources across interest groups, 
and discount for different levels of ‘organisability’ and resources.
✦	 Policy-makers should also re-weight the inputs they receive so as to distinguish 
between shallow or even ‘fake’ harms being claimed by well-organised groups, and 
deeper harms potentially being suffered by hard-to-organise groups.
The interest group process 
Between elections, the interest group process (along with media and social media 
coverage) is a key way in which citizens can seek to communicate with their MPs and other 
representatives, and to influence government policy-makers. Patrick Dunleavy considers 
how far different social groups can gain access and influence decision-makers. How 
democratically does this key form of input politics operate? And how effectively are all UK 
citizens’ interests considered? 
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✦	 Other aspects of liberal democratic processes, such as the ‘manifesto doctrine’ 
that elected governments should implement all components of their election 
programmes, do not over-ride the need to consult and listen in detail to affected 
groups, and to choose policy options that minimise harms and maximise public 
legitimacy and consensus support.
✦	 Since policy-makers must sometimes make changes that impose new risks and 
costs across society, they should in general seek to allocate risks to those groups 
most easily or able to insure against them.
Between elections, the interest groups process generates a great deal of useful and 
perhaps relatively reliable information for policy-makers about preference intensities. 
By undertaking different levels of collective action along a continuum of participation 
opportunities, and incurring costs in doing so, ordinary citizens can accurately indicate how 
strongly they feel about issues to decision-makers.
Actions like sending back a pre-devised public feedback form, writing to an MP, supporting 
an online petition to the government, or tweeting support for something, are cheap to do 
and so only indicate a low level of commitment. Joining (and paying membership fees 
to) an interest group or going to meetings shows more commitment, and gives the group 
legitimacy and weight with politicians. Going on strike or marching in a demonstration 
indicates a higher level of commitments still. A well-organised interest group process will 
allow for a huge variety of ways in which citizens can indicate their views.
From a somewhat elderly 2006 study, we know that in the UK there were over 7,800 
interest groups registered by group directories for the field. Jordan and Greenan  
demonstrate that business trade associations (many very small) were by far the greatest 
number, followed in numerical terms by professional groups and learned societies. 
Campaigning and pressure groups ranked only fifth of their category types. Some individual 
groups have grown very large memberships in the millions or hundreds of thousands – 
such as the UK’s few trade unions, which have coalesced into a few very large membership 
bodies, or the National Trust or Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.
As Figure 1 shows, four out of five interest groups recruited individual members, and three 
out of five only recruited individuals – so their significance for elected politicians was based 
quite heavily on their size. Those that can engage the participation of almost all the people 
in a given occupation or role will carry especial weight, as with the well-organised medical 
professions. Over time the numbers of non-business groups (with individual memberships) 
grew substantially from 1970 to 2006, as the table part of Figure 1 shows. Campaigning 
groups grew slightly more in numbers than the general trend.
The remaining fifth of interest groups (all of them business or trade associations) only 
recruited firms as members, and a further fifth recruited both firms and individual members. 
Here legitimacy may be based on what proportion of a given industry or type of business 
are engaged with bodies claiming to represent them. Often rather divergent voices 
have claimed to represent business interests – as in the long-run rivalry between the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI; which represents big firms and operates in a
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Figure 1: The distribution of UK interest groups in 2006
Type of non-
trade group
1970 2006 % change
Professional 606 1,167 93
General interest 259 565 118
Campaigning 191 414 117
Total 1,056 2,146 103
Firm members only  
22%
Both firm members and  
individual members  
19%
Individual members only  
59%
Source: Jordan et al, 2012, Table 7.2, p. 151, & Jordan & Greenan, 2012 Figure 4.1 p.82 & p.92.
politically neutral, corporatist way) and the Institute of Directors (which is more eclectic 
and more right wing). Some industries are dominated by a single interest group, like the 
National Farmers’ Union, which in the past achieved enormous insider influence with the 
relevant Whitehall department. Other looser coalitions of different interests (like the ‘roads 
lobby’ of transport operators, construction companies and motorist organisations) can 
achieve a similar dominance, however.
At any given time, an ‘ecology’ of interest groups operates, with different organisations 
competing for attention, and encouraging their members to commit more resources or 
time to the group. Trade unions have been the biggest and most continuous losers since 
the 1980s. Their membership numbers radically reduced with the decline of manufacturing 
industry and large firms. Numbers and unionisation rates held up better in the public sector, 
but even there, members became markedly less willing to go on strike in recent years. 
Meanwhile environmentally aligned groups and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) 
have flourished. Some big groups that shifted away from restrictive ‘legacy’ modes of 
recruiting members and adopted digital approaches have increased their size radically, 
notably the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. But in the interest group world at large, 
such effects have generally been smaller.
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Recent developments
This area of policy-making has been stable for many years, with occasional fringe scandals 
– a succession of which lead to the 2014 Lobbying Act. This introduced an official register 
of paid lobbyists contacting MPs in Westminster and in touch with Whitehall departments, 
affecting commercial lobbying firms most, together with some groups with developed 
governmental or parliamentary liaison operations. The lobbying industry in the UK is 
estimated by some sources to be worth £2bn a year, but still remains mostly self-regulated, 
especially perhaps in the new ‘digital influencing’ areas. 
The large data analysis and lobbyist firm Cambridge Analytica became a focus of 
controversy in 2018 in the USA and Britain, after it emerged that it had extracted a large 
amount of users’ personal data from Facebook without their knowledge, and used the 
information to construct sophisticated psychological profiles to target voters in the Trump 
campaign, and used by a closely allied company to help the Brexit Leave campaign. The 
firm fought a rearguard action against its critics, but it had to close down when its UK chair 
was caught on video in a ‘sting’ by a UK TV programme, boasting of using illicit influence 
techniques to ruin the reputations of rivals to its clients. With business clients drying up 
the firm shut its doors within a few days. The chief executive attended two grillings by a 
House of Commons select committee, and official investigations continued at the time of 
writing. Critics argued that the incident shone a light on lax regulation of new influence 
technologies, a conclusion that a Commons select committee shared in a critical mid-2018 
report on fake news and social media.
Digital technologies could also play a role in allowing decision-makers to elicit and cheaply 
incorporate mass public views. The UK government re-established an official online 
petitions site in 2015, where citizens can lodge proposals for issues to be reviewed by 
Parliament. Any petition gaining 100,000 verified electronic signatures goes to the House 
of Commons and supposedly gets a debate, followed by a response. Very large numbers 
of petitions are started, but most quickly fail to attract public attention. Only those that 
can generate around 10,000 supporters in the first couple of days have any effective 
chance of reaching the 100,000 target in the time allowed. In 2016 thousands of petitions 
were started but only 10 reached the 100,000 threshold, and four of these were denied a 
parliamentary debate.
However, these initiatives can be influential. In spring 2017 Theresa May invited newly 
elected US President Donald Trump on a state visit to the UK. A petition to ban him quickly 
attracted 1.86 million supporters. Although ministers said that they would ignore this, the 
idea of a visit receded into the long grass until the summer of 2018. And when it did take 
place it was carefully organised to keep the famously touchy US President completely away 
from London and other UK cities where mass protests occurred. 
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Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
British government ministers, MPs, 
politicians and civil servants recognise 
the importance and legitimacy of a 
vigorous interest group process. An open 
consultation process operates for all new 
legislation and government policy White 
Papers, and sometimes for statutory 
instruments.
Where interest groups are battling against party 
A’s manifesto commitments, and especially where 
they are aligned with a rival party B, they will 
face an uphill struggle to make any changes in 
the incumbent government’s policies. Governing 
parties in the UK have a strong record of pushing 
through partisan commitments, and over-riding 
the opposition of groups who do not support 
them. The UK has no equivalent of the European 
Union’s formal reporting back of consultation 
outcomes. Ministers and civil servants commonly 
‘talk up’ any support their proposals secure, while 
ignoring or belittling unfavourable feedback.
Parliamentary processes, including the 
consideration of legislation, questions to 
ministers, and select committee hearings, 
connect strongly with the interest group 
process. Most legitimate or established 
groups can find MPs to represent their 
interests or cause, or to help from their 
position in the legislature. However, 
select committee inquiries access 
quite a restricted and biased range of 
‘recognised’ interests. Public involvement 
processes in the devolved Scottish, 
Welsh, Northern Ireland and London 
legislatures/assemblies are generally far 
more systematic and inclusive.
There are sharp inequalities in the capabilities 
of different social groups to monitor policy 
proposals and to get effectively involved in official 
consultation and legislative processes. The 
poorest and least socially resourced groups in 
British society rely chiefly on NGOs, charities and 
altruistic philanthropists to secure any research 
or campaigning on issues that concern them. By 
contrast, business interests have well-developed 
government and parliamentary liaison units, and 
ready access to professional lobbyists, public 
relations consultants, marketers and media 
experts – giving corporations and well-off elites 
inherent advantages that are hard to counteract.
UK decision-makers are alert to the 
potentially excessive power of lobbyists 
and of well-resourced groups best able to 
afford lobbyists and other organised and 
commoditised means of influence. Most (if 
not all) politicians discount heavily for the 
‘industrialised’ lobby power of business 
and other wealthy groups. Lobbying is 
regulated and any excesses in attempting 
to secure influence are frowned upon and 
quickly stamped out – as the Cambridge 
Analytica case demonstrates.
Lobbying in the UK has historically focused 
most attention on creating private links with civil 
servants and ministers, exercised at early stages 
of the policy process, and often carried out 
without transparency. Concertation of ministerial 
decisions and business interests have been 
fuelled by incidents like the hundreds of emails 
between News International and the private office 
of the responsible minister, Jeremy Hunt, during a 
take-over battle he had to adjudicate in 2010–12. 
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
As the powers of the House of Commons 
committees have slowly grown, and coalition 
governments operated in hung parliaments in 
2010–15 and 2017–present, so more lobbying 
has focused on the legislature. Because MPs 
and peers can work for outside jobs and take 
money from well-funded interests, there have 
been a succession of scandals around MPs, 
peers and even ministers not declaring interests.
For elected politicians, what matters most 
is the vote-power of groups, which is a 
function of their size (large membership 
groups are more influential than small 
ones), the intensity of their preferences 
(groups that care a lot outweigh apathetic 
ones), and their pivotality (giving more 
importance to potential ‘swing’ groups 
who might shift support between parties, 
shaping who wins). There are inherent 
influence inequalities between groups, 
but because they derive essentially from 
their role in the electoral process, they 
are generally democratically defensible.
For politicians the realpolitik of the interest 
group process is that they appease groups 
whose support they rely on. But they will 
cheerfully impose costs on groups normally 
opposed to them, or too small or poorly 
organised to do them electoral damage. 
Both ministers and civil servants also routinely 
extract a ‘good behaviour’ price for conceding 
influence to any ‘insider’ group. To remain 
influential the group must only express critical 
views ‘moderately’ and privately, at early stages 
of policy development before proposals go 
public. They must normally mute any public 
criticisms altogether, or tone them down to be 
non-confrontational or expressed ‘responsibly’.
Saturation media coverage, and now 
social media coverage as well, means 
that the risks for politicians in lightly or 
overtly deferring to powerfully organised 
interests have increased. Modern policy-
making has shifted more into cognitive 
modes of competition between rival 
coalitions of interests. Here the quality 
of evidence you can produce to back a 
case, and sustain effective participation 
in policy debates, counts for more than 
simple voting power or financial might. A 
more deliberative interest group process 
has emerged, which has evened up 
access to the policy terrain.
Cognitive competition remains heavily 
influenced by resources and money. Wealthy 
interests can better afford to fund research and 
information gathering than groups representing 
the poor and powerless. Wealthy interests can 
also trigger more law cases in areas favourable 
to them and thus ensure that legal knowledge 
differentially develops in helpful ways.
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Future opportunities Future threats
The growth of social media and internet-based 
modes of organising has radically lowered the 
information and transaction costs of organising 
collective actions in the last two decades, and 
promises to continue doing so. In particular, 
large-scale citizen mobilisations by spatially 
dispersed or ‘functional’ groups (for example, 
patients affected by a particular disease, or 
citizens with a shared specialist interest) have 
become far more feasible and influential.
Lobbying and public relations professionals 
have extended the techniques and services 
they use for commercial and other well-
funded interests so as to increasingly 
manipulate social media in expert ways. A 
new and powerful ‘data-industrial complex’ 
has recently emerged, as the Leave 
campaign for the Brexit referendum aptly 
demonstrated.
The mass emergence of ‘clicktivism’ allows 
individuals to spontaneously signal their 
position on public issues on Twitter, Facebook 
and other social media. These ‘micro-
donations’ of time and support mean that 
people get instant feedback on the popularity 
of their views and potentially linkages to 
like-minded people. This radically enhances 
the speed and granularity of the public’s 
collective vigilance over policy-making in 
liberal democracies. However, more critical 
citizen activist campaigners like Alberto 
Alemmano stress that clicktivism cannot be 
an end in itself, but must be part of a wide 
armoury of modernised citizen engagement 
leading to ‘real world’ engagement.
By increasingly ‘delegating’ the job of 
representing diverse relatively powerless 
societal interests to NGOs and charities, 
and restricting their own participation to 
digital means, well-educated and altruistic 
middle-class people have created another 
spiral in the further ‘professionalisation’ 
of democratic politics. Groups that slip 
between the gaps of NGOs’ concerns (for 
example, perhaps ‘Fathers for Justice’) 
can lose out badly from this system. Their 
inexpert autonomous efforts to organise 
become ever more marginalised in the 
political world.
Crowdfunding via the internet has increasingly 
emerged as a way that large and dispersed 
groups can fund previously difficult 
mobilisations. The anti-Brexit lobbyist Gina 
Miller used this technique to back anti-Brexit 
candidates in the 2017 general election, as did 
other satellite campaigns. (However, her more 
famous Supreme Court legal case against the 
government was privately funded.) Similarly, 
‘open source’ techniques of organising can 
often help otherwise disadvantaged groups to 
operate more effectively in competition with 
business hierarchies.
The virulent tone of the Brexit referendum 
campaign upset many charities. The 
chief executive of the National Council of 
Voluntary Organisations said he regretted 
they had not spoken out enough because 
of fear of running foul of the 2014 lobbying 
regulations, plus being pilloried in the 
media. In Brexit policy development up 
to summer 2018, ministers and Whitehall 
have seemed reluctant to bring in outside 
voices, and groups have felt excluded, 
despite their EU expertise, according to 
Jeremy Richardson.
Interest groups were keen to get involved 
in the Brexit negotiations, not least because 
they know a lot about the EU policy process 
– but pro-Remain industry interventions were 
fiercely attacked by Brexiteer politicians.
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‘Managing’ decision-making consultations
Elections inherently give policy-makers only a crude and infrequent idea of public opinion. 
Parties must aggregate issues together into programmes and manifestos. Citizens can only 
cast a single vote, with no capacity to indicate which issues or policy commitment counts 
most with them. Nor can they express the different strength of their preferences on multiple 
issues. So even politicians with a clear manifesto commitment to implement have just a 
direction of travel, not a detailed route map for getting anywhere that works.
Public consultation processes (some linked to legislation or executive orders) generate huge 
volumes of very specific information about how and why different interests are affected by 
proposed policy changes, which will bear costs and which see benefits in them. Often the 
detailed information needed for effective policy implementation rests with trade associations, 
firms, trade unions, professions, NGOs, sub-national governments, or academia rather than 
in Whitehall. Hence in any policy area there will either be a ‘policy community’ that is strongly 
networked, regularly influential and perhaps closed to outsider groups. Alternatively there 
may be a looser ‘policy network’, linking the main groups that regularly comment on policy 
issues, but with more weakly tied or changeable sets of participants.
A well-organised civil society may seem to leave Whitehall and ministers in a weak position, 
and in the past some political scientists rather fancifully described a ‘hollow crown’ that 
has resulted in the UK. However, ministers and civil servants do not assign equal weight to 
all actors in networks, but instead demand ‘responsible’ behaviours from those to whom 
they will listen, such as think tanks, business lobbies, professions or expert academics. 
‘Insider’ groups have the ear of policy-makers, while more strident, public and ‘extreme’ 
voices are routinely discounted. 
Finally, sophisticated opinion polling now allows both politicians and the public to regularly 
learn how different types of citizen feel about issues – so the policy influence of public 
opinion as a whole has improved and magnified. A lot of media and social media coverage 
and commentary also ensures that policy-makers continuously ‘get the message’ about 
which bits of their proposals are popular and with whom.
Corporate power in the interest group process
Yet is the apparent diversity and pluralism of the consultation process just a misleading 
façade? Vladimir Lenin famously argued that the liberal democratic state was ‘tied by a 
thousand threads’ into doing things that owners of capital want. And a concern about the 
‘privileged position of business’ in dealing with government extends widely amongst 
liberal authors too, such as Charles Lindblom. Since businesses generate economic growth 
and taxes, they have special salience in making demands on politicians and officials. And 
as the journalist Robert Peston argued:
‘The wealthy will [always] find a way to buy political power – whether through 
the direct sponsorship of politicians and parties, or through the acquisition of 
media businesses, or through the financing of think tanks. The voices of the 
super-wealthy are heard by politicians well above the babble of the crowd…. 
We are more vulnerable than perhaps we have been since the nineteenth 
century to the advent of rule by an unelected oligarchy’ (p.346).
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In a discussion for Democratic Audit, David Beetham drew attention to how dominant 
financial corporate sectors in the UK economy first caused the 2008 economic crash 
by forcing through rash financial deregulation. But these same interests were then 
differentially rescued by unprecedented state bailouts by the biggest banks. And to 
stop a wider decline, ‘quantitative easing’ by the Bank of England propped up the asset 
values of the wealthiest groups in society. Via transfer pricing, debt loading and shifting 
domicile the largest global companies have also effectively evaded corporation taxes and 
undermined the UK fiscal regime. Public disquiet and ‘tax-shaming’ mobilisations by online 
activists have dented this regime (for example, a consumer boycott forced Starbucks 
into ‘voluntarily’ paying nominal amounts of UK corporation tax), and forced a rethink of 
previous pro-multinational tax policies across the OECD.
Competition between ‘advocacy coalitions’
A more benign view of changes in the interest group process is given by the ‘advocacy 
coalition framework’ (ACF). This modern pluralist view argues that the key influences 
on public policies now are cognitive ones, turning on empirical evidence, research and 
cognitions. Old-style, ‘big battalion’ groups – like big corporations, media barons and mass 
ranks of trade unions – sought influence on the basis that they could mobilise adverse 
votes at the ballot box or unfavourable coverage by media commentators. But most policy-
level influence now comes from a different process of cognitive competition where rational 
arguments and evidence chiefly sway policy-makers, not political self-interest alone.
Nor are the battles that matter fought any longer by single interest groups, but rather by 
competing ‘advocacy coalitions’ that bring together diverse clusters or networks of groups 
aligned on each side of the policy debate. For example, on tobacco policy a succession 
of nudge interventions by government followed up periodically by regulatory restrictions 
and new legislation have progressively strengthened the disincentives for smoking and 
curtailed ‘passive smoking’ in the UK – and Figure 2 shows impacts in terms of falls in 
the number of smokers. The apparently ascendant coalition here includes anti-smoking 
charities, the medical professions, NHS authorities, the health department in Whitehall, 
progressive local authorities who forced the pace of implementation, many non-smokers 
(especially those adversely affected by ‘passive smoking’), and so on. 
The coalition fighting a rearguard action against smoking regulation includes of course the 
tobacco corporations front and centre, plus some other aligned businesses, pro-‘freedom’ 
or libertarian think tanks, Tories opposing a ‘nanny state’, and a diminishing minority of still-
enthusiastic smokers. 
Yet has the progress achieved in reducing smoking incidence over recent decades been 
fast and furious (as defenders of the UK’s policy apparatus might say), or slow and often 
stalled? How you assess the scale and speed of these changes will shape how effectively 
you think cognitive competition changes the dynamics of group competition.
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Figure 2: The proportion of men and women smoking in Great Britain, 2000–17
Source: Office of National Statistics Dataset, 2018.
Conclusions
Nobody now claims that the UK’s interest group process is an equitable one (a position 
wrongly attributed to pluralists by their critics). Even common sense requires that we 
recognise there are big and powerful lobbies, medium influence groups and ‘no hopers’ 
battling against a hostile consensus. Democracy requires that each interest be able to 
effectively voice their case, and have it heard by policy-makers on its merits, so that the 
group can in some way shape the things that matter most to them. On the whole, the 
first (voice) criterion is now easily met in Britain. But achieving any form of balanced, 
deliberative consideration of interests by policy-makers remains an uphill struggle. 
Business dominance is perhaps reduced by restrictions on lobbying and extra transparency 
from social media. But it is still strong, despite some shifts towards cognitive competition 
over policy solutions and towards more deliberative and evidence-based policy-making.
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What does liberal democracy require of a media system?
✦	 The media system should be diverse and pluralistic, including different media types, 
operating under varied systems of regulation, designed to foster free competition for 
audiences and attention, and a strong accountability of media producers to citizens 
and public opinion.
✦	 Taken as a whole, the regulatory set-up should guard against the distortions 
of competition introduced by media monopolies or oligopolies (dominance of 
information/content ‘markets’ by two or three owners or firms), and against any state 
direction of the media.
✦	 A free press is a key part of media pluralism – that is, privately owned newspapers, 
with free entry by competitors and only normal forms of business regulation (those 
common to any industry) by government and the law.
✦	 Because of network effects, state control of bandwidth, and the salience of TV/radio 
for citizens’ political information, a degree of ‘special’ regulation of broadcasters to 
ensure bipartisan or neutral coverage and balance is desirable, especially in election 
campaign periods. However, regulation of broadcasters must always be handled at 
arm’s length from control by politicians or state officials, by an impartial quasi-non-
governmental organisation (quango) with a diverse board and professional staffs.
✦	 Where government funds a state broadcaster (like the BBC), this should also be 
set up at arm’s length, and with a quango governance structure. Government 
ministers and top civil servants should avoid forms of intervention that might seem 
The media system 
The growth of ‘semi-democracies’ across the world, where elections are held but are rigged 
by state power-holders, has brought into ever-sharper focus how much a country’s media 
system conditions the quality of its democracy. Free elections without some form of media 
diversity and balance clearly cannot hope to deliver effective liberal democracy. Ros Taylor 
and the Democratic Audit team look at how well the UK’s media system operates to 
support or damage democratic politics, and to ensure a full and effective representation of 
citizens’ political views and interests.
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to compromise the state broadcaster’s independence in generating political, public 
policy or other news and commentary.
✦	 Journalistic professionalism is an important component of a healthy media 
system, and the internalisation of respect for the public interest and operation of a 
‘reputational economy’ within the profession provide important safeguards against 
excesses, and an incentive for innovation. Systems that strengthen occupational 
self-regulation within the press are valuable.
✦	 The overall media system should provide citizens with political information, evidence 
and commentary about public policy choices that are easy to access, at no or low 
cost. The system should operate as transparently as possible, so that truthful/factual 
content predominates, it quickly ‘drives out’ incorrect content and ‘fake news’, and 
that ‘passing off’ and other lapses are minimised and rapidly counteracted.
✦	 People are entitled to published corrections and effective redress against any 
reporting that is unfair, incorrect or invades personal and family privacy. Citizens are 
entitled to expect that media organisations will respect all laws applying to them, 
and will not be able to exploit their power to deter investigations or prosecutions by 
the police or prosecutors.
✦	 Public interest defences should be available to journalists commenting on possible 
political, state and corporate wrongdoing, and media organisations should enjoy 
some legal and judicial protection against attempts to harass, intimidate or penalise 
them by large and powerful corporations, or by the state.
✦	 At election times especially, the media system should inform the electorate 
accurately about the competing party manifestos and campaigns, and encourage 
citizens’ democratic participation.
The UK has long maintained one of the best developed systems for media pluralism 
amongst liberal democracies, centring on five components:
(i)  A free press, one that is privately owned and regulated only by normal business 
regulations and civil and criminal law provisions. The biggest UK newspapers are highly 
national in their readership and coverage. They characteristically adopt strong political 
alignments to one party or another. A voluntary self-regulation scheme has provided 
only a weak code of conduct and system of redress in the event of mistakes in reporting 
or commentary.
(ii)  A publicly owned broadcaster (the BBC), operated by a quasi-non-governmental 
agency (quango), at arm’s length from any political control by the state or politicians. It is 
regulated by another arm’s length quango, Ofcom, so as to be politically impartial in its 
coverage, according space to different parties and viewpoints.
(iii) A few private sector broadcasters whose political coverage is regulated by the same 
set of rules to be politically impartial – which are also set and enforced by Ofcom, 
insulated from control by politicians, the state and from the broadcasters themselves.
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(iv) Strongly developed journalistic professionalism, with common standards of reporting 
accuracy, and much looser agreement on fairness in commentary and respect for 
privacy, shared across (almost) the whole occupational group. But breaches are 
enforced only informally by weak social sanctions, such as disapproval or reputational 
damage for offenders within the profession. 
(v)  Social media, which are an increasingly salient aspect of the media system, and 
resemble the free press in being unregulated beyond normal legal provisions. The 
biggest online sites and associated social media are journalistically produced by 
newspapers, and generally operate on the same lines, although with less political 
colouration of news priorities. However, much politically relevant content is also 
generated by a wide range of non-government organisations (NGOs), pressure groups 
and individuals, many of whom are strongly politically aligned and may not feel bound 
by journalistic standards. (See Chapter 3.4 for a detailed discussion of social media.)
Recent developments
In recent years, the UK’s media landscape has undergone enormous transformation. 
Not only has news consumption shifted online, but the growth in digital social media 
has enabled people to originate, find and share information in ways that challenge the 
traditional hegemony of state-funded broadcasters and the national press.
The biggest source of concern about the democratic qualities of the UK’s media system 
has been that most of the press perennially back the Conservative Party (in very forceful 
ways in most cases). Far fewer papers normally back Labour, and the Liberal Democrats 
receive only episodic support from smaller papers. Once predicted to become just another 
depoliticised operation of conglomerate corporations, in fact newspapers are still run in 
a hands-on, ‘press baron’ fashion by powerful companies or media magnates (like Rupert 
Murdoch and the Barclay brothers). Figure 1 shows that the fiercely anti-Labour and pro-
Brexit Sun is by far the biggest newspaper, and Rupert Murdoch also owns the Times/
Sunday Times. The Daily Mail, Daily Express and Daily Telegraph complete the Tory press 
hegemony. The Labour-backing Trinity Group newspapers (owning the Daily Mirror, Daily 
Record, and The People) have smaller readerships, as does the Guardian. Some papers 
also take a neutral or more varied political line.
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Figure 1: The percentage of UK respondents who used different TV, radio and print news 
sources in 2017 – and the political affiliations of these sources
Source Political stance
% used 





BBC News (TV & radio) Regulated non-partisan 53 64
ITV News Regulated non-partisan 20 33
Sky News Regulated non-partisan 14 21
Sun (& Sunday Sun) Conservative, Brexiteer 7 15
Daily Mail (& Sunday) Conservative, Brexiteer* 8 13
Metro (free) Non-political 6 11
Regional or local newspapers Varied 4 11
Daily Mirror (SM, Daily Record) Labour, EU pragmatic 6 10
Channel 4 News Regulated non-partisan 4 10
Commercial radio news Regulated non-partisan 7 10
Times/Sunday Times Conservative, EU pragmatic 3 7
Guardian/ Observer Labour, Remainer 2 5
London Evening Standard (free) Conservative, Remainer 2 4
Daily Telegraph (& Sunday) Conservative, Brexiteer 2 4
‘I’ (newspaper) Independent, Remainer 2 4
CNN Regulated non-partisan 1 4
Daily Express (& Sunday) Conservative, Brexiteer 1 2
Political orientation of source
 
 
Regulated non-partisan 99 142
Conservative 24 47
Labour 8 15
Independent, non-political press 8 15
Brexit orientation of source
 
Brexiteer 18 34
Neutral or EU pragmatic 105 153
Remainer 4 9
Source: Data from Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018 (Express from full survey data supplied). 
Classifications of political orientations by the authors.
Note: Percentages sum to more than 100% because people use multiple media sources. *The Daily Mail 
was strongly pro-Brexit, but the Mail on Sunday supported Remain.
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However, Figure 1 also shows that in terms of media exposure the non-partisan broadcast 
news media have maintained far more reach and regular use than print newspapers. In 
modern times a trio of TV news outlets (BBC, ITV and Sky News) plus radio have provided 
much of people’s political information. All broadcasters operate under political neutrality 
rules that apply with special force during election campaigns. They must achieve a 
bipartisan balancing of Conservative and Labour issues and viewpoints (given their historic 
dominance in shaping general election voting) plus the broadly proportional representation 
of other parties – for example, giving the SNP in Scotland equal prominence. Optimists 
about the media system would point out that in Figure 1 four times as many people have 
used non-partisan media than have read Conservative-aligned newspapers. Similarly, more 
than five times as many people have used sources that take a neutral or pragmatic view 
of Brexit than have used strongly pro-Brexit sources. Figure 1 also shows that most people 
use multiple media sources and thus are exposed to a mix of partisan and non-partisan 
coverage of issues and politics.
However, newspaper-run websites now provide major sources of revenue for the press, 
and they compete for online attention with the broadcasters’ websites and online-only 
publications. Figure 2 shows that the papers’ online readership produces a greater 
balancing of political alignments in the digital world. During the 2015 and 2017 election 
campaigns Labour enjoyed the backing of the Guardian website, which has a much bigger 
reach than its print version. The Daily Mirror is also prominent. On the Tory side the Daily 
Mail is the leading online title, along with the Telegraph.
Figure 2: The online monthly readership of UK newspaper websites (in 2017)
Source: UK Press 
Gazette
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These modifying factors perhaps have begun to blunt the ‘power of the press’ compared 
with (say) the 1992 general election, when Murdoch’s leading title boasted ‘It was the 
Sun wot won it’ for John Major. In 2017, the Sun’s election day ‘Cor-Bin’ front page was 
no less strident in denouncing Jeremy Corbyn. On the day before polling, the Daily Mail 
devoted 13 pages to anti-Corbyn and anti-Labour stories and commentary, with the cover 
headline ‘Apologists for Terror’). The levels of political bias exhibited can also be strikingly 
unconstrained, verging into ‘fake news’ generation, with, for example, the front pages of 
the Sun and Daily Mail both explicitly linking top opposition politicians to terrorist threats.
Yet optimists about the media system point out that Corbyn’s Labour surged in popularity 
during the campaign, and forced a hung parliament, despite facing a wall of Tory press 
criticism. Perhaps, then, media diversity is working after all, allowing voters to form their 
own opinions from a range of different sources?
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the UK’s 
media system remains essentially pluralistic 
when taken as a whole, especially in the 
complementary nature of a free press offset 
by bipartisan regulated broadcasting.
The print versions of the leading national 
newspapers remain wedded to highly 
partisan approaches to covering UK politics 
and elections. Cross-ownership of titles and 
broadcasting by powerful and committed 
corporate leaders actively trying to sway 
elections and policy decisions (like Rupert 
Murdoch) perennially distorts political power 
away from political equality. Traditional forms 
of joint agenda-setting by journalists (‘wolf 
pack’ questioning on top issues) and new 
developments (for example, press preview 
programmes on 24-hour TV and press front 
pages on broadcaster websites) mean that 
press distortions can drag public service 
broadcasters into line with a press-led 
agenda.
The growth of satellite and online TV 
channels, and rapid increases in the numbers 
of specialised or paid-for TV channels (many 
catering for niche interests) has reduced 
the ways in which TV presents a common 
news agenda to all citizens. Yet the BBC, ITV, 
Channel 4 and Sky News still compete very 
effectively for news and politics audiences 
(Figure 1). Although its audience is ageing 
somewhat, the BBC’s broadcast news 
coverage continues to reach two-thirds of 
the public each week.
Press coverage of the 2016 EU referendum 
campaign was frequently hyper-partisan, 
disingenuous or actively misleading (as in 
claims that Turkey was poised to join the EU). 
If and when such claims were ever corrected 
at a media regulator’s request, this happened 
only after readers had voted.
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Current strengths Current weaknesses
The mainstream press has experimented 
with subscription models that offer an 
alternative to paywalls, such as voluntary 
subscriptions or one-off donations and 
crowd-funded journalism.
The public’s reluctance to pay for news, 
both online and offline, as well as declining 
advertising revenues and insurgent start-ups, 
represent an existential threat to established 
press brands and perhaps other media. The 
local press is also in decline, with far fewer 
reporters. Those who remain are sometimes 
based outside their ‘beat’ and discouraged 
from original reporting for reasons of time 
and cost.
Several new versions of self-regulation have 
emerged, with Impress and Ipso offering 
different models (see below). The closure of 
the News of the World over its toxic phone-
hacking culture still looms large in editors’ 
and journalists’ consciousness.
The newspaper industry has failed to 
reach consensus on press regulation after 
the hacking scandal and Leveson report, 
including on the chilling effect of section 
40 of Crime and Courts Act (see below). 
Complaints mechanisms are often weak and 
unclear, especially among new entrants.
The Freedom of Information Act, a key right 
for citizens that is also a valuable tool for 
journalists, has survived repeated threats 
due to Whitehall cost-cutting and politicians’ 
hostility to it.
Court injunctions to force the press to 
respect people’s privacy are the preserve of 
the very wealthy, though are now declining 
in numbers. Ordinary citizens typically find 
it hard to achieve redress or corrections for 
mistakes from newspapers.
Parliamentary reporting has adapted to 
the live blog format, arguably providing 
a more detailed and real-time account of 
proceedings than the legacy print media did.
Coverage of Welsh politics is especially 
inadequate. The nation lacks a powerful 
home-grown media and the Welsh Assembly 
has considered appointing its own team 
of journalists to report proceedings. Like 
local authority-run newspapers, this is a 
problematic development.
Current opportunities Current threats
Libel cases have fallen since the Defamation 
Act 2013 simplified the public interest 
defence. If the trend is maintained, this may 
enable more adventurous investigatory 
reporting in future.
Mainstream media and journalists are 
increasingly distrusted by the public, 
particularly on the left, for their perceived 
biases and remoteness from ‘ordinary 
people’.
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Current opportunities Current threats
Citizens have mobilised on social media 
to counteract newspaper partisan or 
commentary excesses – for example, Stop 
Funding Hate’s campaign to shame big 
advertisers into boycotting newspapers 
accused of anti-Islam coverage and stirring 
up racial hatred. As online sources grow 
more salient, so a somewhat less partisan 
style of political journalism may take root. 
Crowd-funded initiatives like WikiTribune 
may have the potential to make the 
ownership and administration of media 
outlets more transparent and accountable to 
their readers.
Both ‘alt-left’ and ‘alt-right’ media outlets, run 
directly by political interest groups seeking 
to manipulate public debates, have already 
penetrated the UK market. They have often 
used ‘data-industrial complex’ methods to 
target sets of swing citizens, and paid-for 
Facebook and Twitter ‘news’ generation to 
evade journalistic controls or scrutiny. The 
alt-left (for example, the Canary and Evolve 
Politics) claimed extensive influence in the 
2017 general election, while the alt-right (and 
possibly Russian intelligence) seems to have 
helped sway the EU referendum campaign 
towards ‘Leave’.
Recognising the dearth of local news 
reporting, some efforts are being made to 
fund and train reporters (see below).
Official proposals for a modernised 
Espionage Act could threaten whistleblowers 
and introduce a further chilling effect to 
journalists’ ability to pursue stories relating to 
the ‘secret state’.
Hyperlocal news models continue to 
evolve, with the ease of making micro-
payments offering the possibility of an (albeit 
unpredictable) revenue stream (see Chapter 
3.4 on social media).
The declining sales of local newspapers, and 
the closure of many titles, plus the relative 
weakness of regional and local broadcasting 
within the BBC and ITV, have all meant that 
journalistic coverage of local politics has 
drastically fallen away. Court reporting is also 
in steep decline.
The BBC and Sky
The regulated TV broadcasters (and in the BBC’s case, state-funded too) have been a key 
part of the UK’s media system since the BBC was set up in the 1920s. Their role enjoys 
a wide amount of cross-party consensus, but the Tory press has constantly accused the 
BBC of having a ‘left-wing’ and liberal causes bias. Conversely, in 2015–17, when Jeremy 
Corbyn’s Labour leadership was controversial, some ‘alt-left’ outlets attacked the BBC 
(and in particular its political editor, Laura Kuenssberg) for bias against him. The BBC is 
now externally regulated by Ofcom, putting it on a par with other regulated broadcasters, 
instead of the previous exceptional situation where the BBC Trust was both ‘judge and 
jury’ on major complaints. The BBC’s once very extensive online web presence has also 
been greatly cut back to focus on news and programme-specific sites, chiefly as a result 
of commercial rivals complaining to Ofcom that it was ‘crowding out’ their own web 
operations.
A Conservative government green paper in 2015 raised the possibility of cutting or 
reforming the BBC’s licence fee (a disliked tax on TVs) and cutting back the corporation’s 
130 3. How democratic are the channels for political participation?
remit to focus on news. However, the charter renewal of January 2017 guaranteed the 
licence fee’s survival for at least 11 years, with inflation-linked increases until early 2022. A 
new BBC Board – no more than half of whose members are government appointees – was 
put in place to manage the Corporation. The National Audit Office will now play a role in 
scrutinising BBC spending.
The BBC also undertook to serve ethnic minority and regional audiences better. The 
BBC Trust previously found that audiences in the devolved regions felt the corporation 
needed to do more to hold their politicians to account, particularly in Wales, where Cardiff 
University’s 2016 Welsh Election Study identified a ‘democratic deficit’ in media. In Scotland 
SNP supporters have regularly argued that the BBC is pro-union and called for a separate 
Scottish Broadcasting Corporation to be set up. Across the UK, the reach of BBC services is 
falling as its radio and TV audience ages.
The Brexit referendum campaign represented a major challenge for all the UK media, but 
particularly so for the BBC’s public service remit and due impartiality. The subject matter 
was complex and the public was poorly informed about the history and functions of the EU. 
The BBC’s referendum guidelines sought to give ‘due weight’ and prominence to all the 
main strands of argument and to all the main parties, rather than being an overly simplistic 
‘seesaw’ approach to impartiality – the latter critiqued by Jay Rosen as ‘views from 
nowhere’. Despite these efforts, the BBC was criticised for inadequate scrutiny of campaign 
claims on both sides and faced particular opprobrium from Leave-supporting politicians and 
newspapers. After the vote criticism continued from both Leavers and Remainers.
At the height of the News of the World phone hacking scandal, the Murdoch-run 21st 
Century Fox (the ultimate owner of the Sun and the News of the World) withdrew a bid 
to assume full control of Sky that had previously seemed likely to succeed. After an 
interregnum, the bid was renewed and Ofcom was lobbied to block it on the grounds that 
Murdoch’s companies failed a ‘fit and proper’ persons test. Ofcom did not agree and let 
it continue, but the issue was referred by the minister to the Competition and Mergers 
Authority. Their initial findings in January 2018 said that the merger was not in the public 
interest because of media plurality concerns. In July 2018, 21st Century Fox successfully bid 
for Sky, on condition that Sky News was divested to a buyer that will fund it for a decade 
and guarantee its independence.
This bidding war also reflected a new and salient challenge to the established broadcasters 
(and Hollywood film studios) posed by new media players Amazon, Netflix and some similar 
competitors focusing on paid-for, on-demand streaming of drama and entertainment only, 
paralleling the earlier growth of sports and specialist channels. As millions of consumers 
migrate to these services, so the audiences for regular bipartisan TV news may be eroded 
– because fewer people are following TV services offering a mix of services with regular 
slots for news.
Newspaper closures and online paywalls
For the ‘free press’ across the UK, the viability of newspaper titles is crucial. With sales 
and advertising revenue falling, the Independent newspaper ceased all print editions to 
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become online only, and subsequently reported a return to profit. The Times and Financial 
Times continued to maintain online paywalls to fund their journalism, with the Telegraph 
also erecting a partial paywall. The London Evening Standard became a free paper 
in 2009, maintaining its circulation. However, only 3% of Britons have an online news 
subscription, one of the lowest percentages across the European Union. At Murdoch’s 
insistence, The Sun experimented with a paywall in 2013, but abandoned it two years later 
as its online readership numbers fell. A majority of readers seem unwilling to pay for online 
news when it is freely available elsewhere. However, the Guardian reports 500,000 regular 
paying supporters and a further 300,000 one-off contributors.
Regional papers in big cities outside London, and local publications across the country, 
also experienced a drop of 12% in digital and print revenues in 2015–16. Across the UK 198 
local papers closed in 2005–16, plus 40 more in 2017. Falling advertising revenues have 
been the principal driver of local journalism’s decline, but not the only one. More people 
have been renting privately and moving between local areas. The sociologist Anthony 
Giddens argued that social life has become ‘dis-embedded’ from the local level, so that ‘we 
cannot take the existence of local journalism for granted’. The decline in local reporting 
was exemplified in tragic fashion by the failure of west London’s press to pick up on the 
repeatedly expressed concerns of the Grenfell Tower residents on the Grenfell Action 
Group blog about the safety of their building, before it burnt down, killing 72 people in 
June 2017.
Some efforts are being made to reinvigorate the sector. The BBC has earmarked £8m for 
‘local democracy reporters’ from selected news services, giving them training and access 
to BBC video and audio. In addition, the local press decline has been a key catalyst for a 
growth of citizen-driven hyperlocal sites (see Chapter 3.4).
Media ownership, partisanship and transparency
A diversity of media ownership has historically been seen as important because of 
the strong political orientation of the national newspaper titles. But in addition, owning 
newspapers has often helped different capitalist interests to advance their own interests 
in regulatory matters and other public policy concerns, especially where press titles and 
broadcast channels are owned by the same mogul or firm. Elected politicians may want 
to keep powerful media owners onside and so give them the benefit of the doubt in 
regulatory decisions.
Ownership of the major newspapers has long been divided among a few large companies, 
with the American-owned News Corp, publisher of the Sun and the Times/Sunday Times, 
as the dominant player. These, along with the Daily Mail (DMG Media), the Daily Express 
(bought by Trinity Mirror in 2018) and the Telegraph Media Group, continue to dominate 
right-leaning coverage, while the Mirror, the Guardian and the Independent occupy the 
left or centre. Pearson sold the Financial Times to the Japanese company Nikkei in 2015. 
A Saudi investor, Sultan Muhammad Abuljadayel, took a stake of between 25% and 50% in 
the Independent’s holding company in 2017, causing concern among some of its journalists, 
although they were assured its editorial independence would remain intact.
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However, online media has inflicted considerable disruption on the newspaper-dominated 
press model. Digital entrants have used social media to disseminate free news and opinion. 
Some originate in the US (BuzzFeed, the Huffington Post, Vice), others are funded by the 
Russian state (Russia Today and the Edinburgh-based Sputnik). A number of hyper-partisan 
low-cost start-ups – such as Evolve Politics and the Canary, a free-to-access site funded by 
advertising and voluntary subscriptions – have generated their traffic via Facebook. These 
last, which backed the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn unreservedly, enjoyed particular 
success during the 2017 general election campaign. Their online reach among younger 
voters during that campaign may have exceeded that of the established mainstream press.
New entrants are overwhelmingly digital, but in print media the free Metro and small-scale 
print publications such as the anti-Brexit weekly the New European (owned by Archant 
Media) – have also meant that UK media are more pluralistic than ever before. Some 
new players are not transparent about their ownership and do not always choose to 
join a regulator. Neither Sputnik nor Breitbart provide any channel for readers to make a 
complaint about their reporting, apart from an online contact form on the Sputnik page, and 
neither are members of a press regulation body. Social media also presents a new set of 
challenges to democratic debate (see Chapter 3.4).
Journalists have been gloomy about the decline of paid-for news contents and its 
adverse implications for the health of media outlets and the ability of the press to report 
freely. Freedom House identified ‘varied ways in which pressure can be placed on the 
flow of objective information and the ability of platforms to operate freely and without 
fear of repercussions’. They rated the UK’s media environment as ‘free’ in 2017, giving it 
an overall score of 25 (where 0 denotes the most free and 100 the least). This represents 
a four-point worsening in the UK’s score since 2013. Although Freedom House considers 
the UK’s press ‘largely open’, significant concerns about regulation and government 
surveillance are unresolved.
Press regulation and the Crime and Courts Act
Poor or inaccurate media reporting (especially by the press) may generate a great deal 
of misery for the people involved. UK newspapers maintained for many years a very 
weak apparatus of ‘self-regulation’, which collapsed in the wake of a major scandal about 
reporters at the News of the World, Daily Mirror and other tabloid titles ‘hacking’ the 
phones of celebrities and politicians so as to uncover aspects of their private lives. This was 
always a criminal activity, but Scotland Yard proved strangely reluctant to act until long after 
the large scale of scandal became apparent. In 2014, the BBC’s sensationalist live reporting 
of the search of singer Cliff Richard’s home as part of an investigation into allegations of 
sexual offences, featuring helicopter shots of a police raid, was apparently based on police 
leaks. With the case later dismissed, it proved controversial, and the Corporation eventually 
had sizeable damages and legal costs awarded against it for invading Richard’s privacy, in 
a court judgment that some critics argued would constrain future press freedom.
The phone-hacking scandal produced a long-delayed Inquiry into the Culture, Practices 
and Ethics of the Press chaired by Lord Leveson. It deemed the previous Press 
Complaints Commission ‘not fit for purpose’ and it was dissolved. But Leveson’s call for 
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an independent, self-regulatory body to create and uphold a new standards code for the 
media failed to get press cooperation. The only government-created (but independently 
appointed) Press Recognition Panel (PRP) is Impress, which regulates over 100 small, 
chiefly local and digital publications. Most national newspapers have joined the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (Ipso). However, the Financial Times and the 
Guardian chose to set up their own internal mechanisms for handling complaints, citing 
worries about Ipso’s independence and the royal charter model that underpins it. The 
charter is not a statute but is drafted and approved by the Privy Council, which its critics 
argue amounts to ‘unacceptable political involvement’ in press regulation.
To try and make publishers join a PRP-approved regulator, section 40 of the coalition 
government’s Crime and Courts Act 2013 gave those that have done so the opportunity to 
settle libel action through a low-cost arbitration scheme. If they did not, they may be liable 
for the claimant’s costs in libel, privacy or harassment cases. The vast majority of the press 
have vociferously opposed the implementation of section 40, with the Financial Times 
opening its objections by claiming that the press landscape had been ‘utterly transformed’ 
since the publication of the Leveson report. Index on Censorship warned that section 
40 ‘protects the rich and powerful and is a gift to the corrupt and conniving to silence 
investigative journalists – particularly media outfits that don’t have very deep pockets’. 
In March 2018 the responsible minister announced that section 40 would be repealed, 
and the previously proposed second part of the Levenson inquiry scrapped – leaving the 
shape, let alone the effectiveness, of any future press regulation or self-regulation unclear.
Libel law and ‘gag’ orders
For decades the English law of libel has provided for potentially large damages against 
anyone publishing statements likely to lower the reputation of the claimant in the eyes 
of reasonable people, even if the statements were true. Papers also had to prove that 
‘defamatory’ statements were not maliciously motivated. The Defamation Act 2013  
simplified the so-called ‘Reynolds defence’ against libel by codifying it more simply: if a 
statement is in the public interest and the writer reasonably believes it to be so, it enjoys 
protection. In addition, a libel claimant must prove the statement caused ‘serious’ harm. 
English PEN and Index on Censorship both welcomed the overhaul: ‘England’s notorious 
libel laws [have been] changed in favour of free speech’, said the latter. The number of 
defamation cases fell to around 60 in the three years 2014–16. A growing proportion of 
these related to social media postings by private individuals.
English law also allows for ‘gag’ injunctions preventing publication of details (like names) if 
the subject can claim their privacy would be damaged. In recent years these have declined 
greatly, because such information can easily be published by third parties online, and court 
proceedings made public, thus undermining the very purpose of the action. The privacy 
injunction remains a tool of the rich: ‘With average legal fees of £400 an hour, the first court 
hearing would cost up to £100,000,’ reported the Guardian in 2016. For almost all citizens, 
pre-emptive action against breaches of privacy is out of the question, and post-hoc privacy 
actions are likewise impossible. Self-regulation and effective means of redress therefore 
take on an even greater importance. 
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Leaking of government secrets and a proposed Espionage Act
The UK government operates a system (called D notices) where the responsible minister 
can exceptionally bar papers or broadcasters from running items that would endanger a 
clear national interest (for example, publishing the names of UK espionage agents). UK 
journalists have been vigilant in keeping such cases to an absolute minimum. However, 
other developments have changed the picture a lot.
In 2013, the American IT contractor Edward Snowden passed large amounts of classified 
material from the US National Security Agency (NSA) to the Guardian and Washington Post 
which revealed details of government surveillance programmes, also involving GCHQ (the 
UK’s electronic surveillance agency). GCHQ requested the Guardian to handover its copy 
of the material. Instead, warned that the security services were considering taking legal 
action to halt its reporting, the paper destroyed the hard drives and memory chips with 
cutting tools at their offices. This was ‘a largely symbolic act’ the paper said, because the 
same files were stored in other jurisdictions.
As a result, the Law Commission, a normally neutral, expert legal body, undertook a 
review of the Official Secrets Act, and recommended its replacement with a modernised 
Espionage Act in 2016. The proposals immediately created fears that they would 
criminalise receiving and handling any data that the government deems damaging to 
national security, even if editors and journalists were merely examining leaked material. 
The influential Open Rights Group described the new provisions as a ‘full-frontal attack on 
journalism…. The intention is to stop the public from ever knowing that any secret agency 
has ever broken the law.’ However, the Commission’s ‘public consultation’ was badly 
mishandled, and its publicity was even worse. The proposals were sent back for more work, 
initially planned for autumn 2017 and then postponed to September 2018. The Commission 
insists on its website that under its proposals:
‘An offence is only committed if the defendant “knew or had reasonable 
grounds to believe his or her conduct was capable of benefitting a foreign 
power and intended or was reckless as to whether his or her conduct 
would prejudice the safety or interests of the state”. Currently someone 
can commit an offence under the Official Secrets Act 1911 even if he or she 
thought their conduct was in the interests of the UK.’
Re-establishing trust
While trust in the BBC’s ability to deliver accurate and reliable news remains high (70%), 
trust in journalists in the UK overall remains much lower than in most of the EU and USA. 
It is lower still among under-35s and those who describe themselves as left-wing. Among 
journalists themselves, most say owners, advertising and profit considerations have little 
influence over their work. A quarter of them believe that it is sometimes justifiable to 
publish unverified information.
However, fact-checking has become an increasingly common practice online, pioneered 
by the charity FullFact, and later adopted by the BBC, Channel 4 and Guardian. Google’s 
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Digital News Initiative is currently looking at ways to automate parts of the process. 
Mindful of how Donald Trump’s presidency came about and has developed, the media 
industry is beginning to grapple with the question of how to report untrue or contested 
statements made by top politicians.
Conclusions
The media system is changing fast, and it is often easy to lament all change as a decline 
from a past golden age, and to resent ‘new goods’ that are having disruptive effects. 
Optimists, on the other hand, argue that the choice and variety of news information 
available to Britons have never been greater and that press and broadcasters are free from 
censorship or direct government interference.
Pessimists see a largely unreconstructed national press, wedded to truth-bending, 
high intensity partisanship, with unregulated power concentrated in the hands of a few 
press barons (often pushing their corporate agendas as well business interest), and a 
wider profession resistant to any meaningful professionalism or effective self-policing of 
journalistic practices. In the wings, UK government and official sources have proposed 
restrictive laws that would greatly inhibit journalistic enterprise and ability to investigate – 
especially where the UK’s still-large ‘secret state’ operates, largely immune to any public or 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
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